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NOTES
CLASS-BASED DENIALS OF HOSPITAL STAFF
PRIVILEGES AND THE LEARNED
PROFESSIONS EXEMPTION
Hospital medical staffs routinely deny hospital staff privileges to
classes of nonphysician practitioners.1 This practice, which limits free
competition, may constitute a group boycott in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.2 Courts, however, have not always welcomed antitrust
challenges to activities engaged in by the medical profession. Because of
inexperience in evaluating the competitive effects of such activities,3 some
courts have invoked the learned professions4 exemption in the health
care realm to permit less rigorous antitrust scrutiny of the medical
profession.
This Note explores various levels of scrutiny that courts might invoke
to ascertain the validity of class-based denials of hospital staff privileges.
Part I describes how class-based denials of hospital staff privileges limit
competition. Part II discusses the antitrust concepts implicated by class-
based denials. In Part III, this Note analyzes the learned professions
exemption and applies it to the context of class-based denials of hospital
staff privileges. Finally, this Note concludes that the learned professions
exemption should not preclude application of the per se rule. In addi-
tion, courts should not alter the traditional rule of reason inquiry when
analyzing class-based denials.
I. CLASS-BASED DENIALS OF HOSPITAL STAFF PRIVILEGES
In the health care context, a hospital medical staff is comprised of indi-
vidual medical doctors who compete for patients with other doctors and
nonphysician practitioners.5 The medical staff, however, has almost ex-
1. This Note employs the term "nonphysician" as the equivalent of "nonmedical doctor prac-
titioner." The term includes osteopaths, podiatrists, psychologists, chiropractors, and nurse
practitioners.
2. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
5. See Dolan & Ralston, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L.
REv. 707, 713-17 (1981).
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clusive control over the decision to grant or deny hospital staff privileges
to nonphysician practitioners.6 By denying hospital staff privileges to
nonphysician practitioners, the medical staff in several ways limits the
ability of nonphysicians to compete in the market.
First, without hospital staff privileges, nonphysicians may not admit
patients to the hospital.7 Second, if a nonphysician's patient requires
hospital treatment, the nonphysicians must refer the patient to a medical
doctor even if the nonphysician is licensed to perform the necessary
treatment. Such a referral may indicate to health care consumers that
nonphysicians are less competent than medical doctors to provide health
care services.' Finally, the hospital may be the only setting that houses
the sophisticated technology oftentimes necessary for patient care.9
II. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS AND THE GROUP BOYCOTT RULES
A challenge to class-based denials of hospital staff privileges under sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman ActI° requires a showing that the denials unrea-
sonably restrain the trade of nonphysician practitioners."' The Supreme
Court has articulated two tests to aid in this determination. First, under
the rule of reason, a court must weigh the procompetitive and anticompe-
6. Theoretically, the hospital administration decides whether to grant hospital staff privileges
to a class of nonphysician practitioners. The medical staff recommends bylaws to the hospital ad-
ministration detailing which classes of practitioners should be granted hospital staff privileges. The
administration then may accept the recommended bylaws or conduct an independent review. In
practice, however, the members of the medical staff are the main actors in hospital staff decisions.
The administration rarely rejects the medical staff's recommendations. Even if the administration
conducts an "independent" review, it does so in conjunction with representatives of the medical staff.
See JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOs-
PITALS: 1985 MANUAL 31-33, 75; see also Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 711-12.
7. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 709; see also Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe,
Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Conventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 596 n. 1
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Kissam].
8. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 795 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
1777 (1985); see also Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 714.
9. See Groseclose, Hospital Privilege Cases: Braving the Dismal Swamp, 26 S.D.L. REV. 1
(1981); Kessenick, Physicians'Access to the Hospital. An Overview, 14 U.S.F.L. REV. 43 (1979).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part: "Every contract,
combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states... is
declared to be illegal." Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is the primary vehicle by which plaintiffs
challenge the alleged collective anticompetitive activities of competitors. "[Tlhe governing law has
been that the Sherman Act bans all concerted arrangements which are adopted for the purpose of
reducing competition, or which, regardless of purpose, have a significant tendency to reduce compe-
tition." L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 166 (1977).
11. See, eg., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60-62 (1911).
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titive effects of a restraint to ascertain its validity. 12 If the anticompeti-
tive effects predominate, the restraint is unreasonable and in violation of
section 1.t1 The rule of reason, however, exacts substantial judicial and
business costs.14 As a result, the Supreme Court also developed a second
test, the per se rule.' 5
The per se rule invalidates whole categories of restraints on trade.
16
Courts justify per se invalidation on the ground that the restraint under
consideration has such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue" that the restraint is per se unreasonable.' 7 Under
the per se rule, the court finds a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
if the plaintiff proves that the defendants engaged in the proscribed con-
duct.' 8 The court does not evaluate the competitive effects of the
restraint. 19
12. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
13. Id. The rule of reason inquiry does not encompass all possible justifications of the particu-
lar restraint. "Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's effect on competitive condi-
tions." Professional Engineers, 435 U.S. at 688. Justice Brandeis' often quoted statement in Chicago
Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), sets forth the confines of the rule of reason:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
thereby promotes competition, or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy com-
petition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint
was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of
the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the
purpose or end sought to be obtained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse; but because
knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id.
14. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982). The rule of
reason often requires elaborate factual inquiries into the purpose of a particular restraint and its
effects on competition. Such inquiries strain already limited judicial resources. Furthermore, be-
cause judges lack experience in determining and predicting competitive effects, the courts do not
achieve consistent results. Without consistency, the business community is left with little, if any,
guidance as to future application of the rule in similar cases.
15. Id.
16. See Northwestern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). In Northern Pacific
Railway, the Supreme Court stated: "Among the practices which the courts have.., deemed to be
[per se] unlawful.., are price fixing[,] division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements."
Id. at 5 (citations omitted).
The Court has freely admitted that the per se rule, in some circumstances, may invalidate a re-
straint otherwise reasonable under the rule of reason test. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County
Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982); United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 341
(1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
17. 365 U.S. at 5.
18. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
19. "Behavior is illegal per se when the plaintiff need prove only that it occurred in order to win
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Courts have held that one restraint that warrants application of the per
se rule is the group boycott.20 A group boycott is a joint effort by in-
dependent economic actors designed to deny potential competitors access
to a market or to inhibit the competitor's efforts to compete in the mar-
ket.21 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted group boycott activi-
ties as per se violations, that result is not automatic. 22  Courts are
required to review each alleged group boycott to determine whether the
boycott merits per se condemnation.23
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co.,24 the Supreme Court identified two grounds for per se invalidation
of group boycotts. First, a court can impose the per se rule if the boy-
cotting activities demonstrate anticompetitive animus.25 The Northwest
Wholesale Court reasoned that anticompetitive animus necessarily gives
his case, there being no other elements to the offense and no allowable defense." R. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 18 (1978).
20. See supra note 16.
21. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 105 S. Ct,
2613, 2619 (1985).
22. Id. See also R. BORK, supra note 19, at 330. Judge Bork points out two examples of group
boycotts that are not per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act: sports leagues and law firms. Id.
at 332-33.
23. See 105 S. Ct. at 2619-21. Before courts may apply the group boycott analysis, however,
the plaintiff must take two preliminary showings. First, the plaintiff must show that the defendants
contracted, combined, or conspired to restrain trade. See supra note 10. In the class-based denial
context, the medical staff's joint activity in denying privileges to nonphysicians should satisfy the
contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 814
(3d Cir. 1984) ("the medical staff is a combination of individual doctors"). Second, the plaintiff must
show that the restraint is "in interstate trade." See supra note 10. Whether a particular class-based
denial has sufficient impact on interstate commerce to implicate the Sherman Act is necessarily a
fact-bound inquiry. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 628-37.
24. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985). In Northwest Wholesale, Pacific alleged that its expulsion from a
wholesale cooperative was a group boycott that should be held a per se violation of § 1. The district
court refused to apply the per se rule and applied the rule of reason. Noting that the record exhib-
ited no anticompetitive effects, the court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the expulsion from the cooperative without procedural safe-
guards was a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 2616.
25. Id. at 2620. Pacific argued that expulsion from a wholesale cooperative necessarily implied
anticompetitive intention on the part of the cooperative and its members. The Court stated, how-
ever, that "purchasing cooperatives must establish and enforce reasonable rules in order to function
effectively." Id. Because the cooperative alleged that it had expelled Pacific for violating a rule
requiring disclosure of a change in ownership, the expulsion did not necessarily imply anticompeti-
tive animus. Id. Pacific also argued that the cooperative intended to competitively disadvantage
Pacific. Id. at 2620 n.7. The Court stated that under some circumstances the anticompetitive moti-
vation of a defendant might give rise to the requisite inference of anticompetitive animus. "[B]ut
such an argument is appropriately evaluated under the rule of reason analysis." Id.
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rise to the inference that the group boycott likely has predominantly an-
ticompetitive effects, thereby justifying per se invalidation.26
Second, a court can apply the per se rule if the defendants possess
market power in the relevant geographic market.27 Possession of market
power substantially increases the likelihood that the group boycott has
predominantly anticompetitive effects.28  The market power rationale
also allows a court to invoke the per se rule if the defendants possess
exclusive access to a facility that is necessary for effective competition.
Such a denial also raises the inference of predominantly anticompetitive
effects, thereby justifying application of the per se rule.2 9
Class-based denials arguably are voidable as per se invalid group boy-
cotts. Class-based denials satisfy the definition of a group boycott. By
refusing hospital staff privileges to a class of nonphysician practitioners,
the members of the medical staff and the hospital administration are en-
gaging in joint activity that inhibits the efforts of the nonphysicians to
compete in the health care market.3" In addition, a particular class-based
denial could satisfy the requirements of Northwest Wholesale. The denial
could demonstrate anticompetitive animus or occur in a context in which
the defendants possess market power. Either situation would raise the
inference that anticompetitive effects predominate, thereby justifying ap-
plication of the per se rule.31
Courts, however, may decline to apply the per se rule to group boy-
cotts and apply the rule of reason instead, if the nature of the industry
26. Id. (citing Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9
(1979)).
27. Id. at 2619, 2621. The facts of Northwest Wholesale did not support a finding that the
defendants possessed market power. Id. The Court, however, did not define the contours of market
power in terms of group boycotts. Cf Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551,
1559 (1984) (defining market power in a tying arrangement case as the power "to force a purchaser
to do something that he would not do in a competitive market").
28. 105 S. Ct. at 2621.
29. Id. at 2619, 2621. Unfortunately, the Court did not clearly articulate the relationship be-
tween market power and exclusive access to a necessary facility. The Court suggested that a finding
of either exclusive access or market power would support invocation of the per se rule. Id. at 2621.
In the class-based denial of hospital staff privileges context, the defendants are unlikely to possess
exclusive access to the hospital facility unless they also possess market power. Although a hospital
staff will have exclusive access to one hospital, see supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text, it will not
possess exclusive access to a facility necessary for effective competition unless it also possesses mar-
ket power within the relevant market. Therefore, in this context, the defendants' exclusive access to
one hospital facility should not be an independent rationale for invoking the per se rule.
30. For the definition of group boycott, see text accompanying supra note 21.
3 1. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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under consideration requires individual inquiry into restraints on compe-
tition.32 The determination of whether the nature of the health care in-
dustry compels scrutiny under the rule of reason requires an examination
of the learned professions exemption.
III. THE LEARNED PROFESSIONS EXEMPTION
The learned professions exemption purports to excuse the learned pro-
fessions, 33 including the medical profession, from application of the anti-
trust laws.34 The exemption is premised on the belief that the professions
exist to provide community service, unlike other businesses that exist to
maximize profits.3 - Lower courts and commentators have adopted this
rationale to support a more lenient review of anticompetitive professional
activities.3 6 While the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of the
learned professions exemption, it has never applied the exemption to ex-
cuse anticompetitive behavior.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,37 the Supreme Court rejected a
county bar association's attempt to invoke the learned professions ex-
emption to protect absolutely the bar's price-fixing scheme.38 The Court
32. 105 S. Ct. at 2620 (citing National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2961 (1984)).
33. The learned professions include: attorneys, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773
(1975); engineers, see National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978);
medical doctors, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); and dentists,
see Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977).
34. For a detailed discussion of the learned professions exemption, see Sims, Maricopa: Are the
Professions Different?, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 177 (1983).
35. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975); see also Dolan & Ralston,
supra note 5, at 735-36 (the Supreme Court allowed for the learned professions exemption because of
the anticompetitive nature of the professions and to prevent the rejection of all quality-of-care ratio-
nales for professional restraints). But see Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 ("It is no disparagement of the
practice of law as a profession to acknowledge that it has [a] business aspect.").
36. See infra notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text. But see Sims, supra note 34, at 178 ("But
for the misguided self-interest of lawyers and perhaps the subconscious reluctance of the profession.
als on the Supreme Court to finally and completely bite the bullet, this issue would be thrown in the
intellectual wastebasket where it belongs.").
37. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
38. Id. at 786-88. In Goldfarb, the plaintiffs attempted to find an attorney who would perform
a title search for them for less than the 1% fee "recommended" by the county bar association. Id. at
775-76. Of the twenty attorneys who responded to the plaintiffs' request, not one would deviate
from the recommended fee. Id. at 776. The State Bar Association enforced the fee schedule.
Although the state bar had never formally disciplined an attorney for not complying with the fee
schedule, the bar had published an ethical opinion containing veiled threats of disciplinary action
that would be taken against noncompliers. Id. at 776-78.
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found that the language of section 1 of the Sherman Act did not provide
for a learned professions exemption. 39 The Court added that the exemp-
tion urged by the bar contradicted the broad reading of the Sherman Act
as contemplated by Congress.' In dictum, however, the Court conceded
that the "public service aspect" and other features unique to the profes-
sions were relevant to antitrust analysis, but did not apply in this case.41
The Goldfarb dictum spurred many lower courts to recognize a limited
learned professions exemption.42 Several lower courts invoked the ex-
emption to apply the rule of reason to cases in which other precedent
indicated that the per se rule should apply.4 3 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has never endorsed such an application of the learned professions
exemption and has specifically rejected it in the area of price fixing.44
In Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,45 two groups of medi-
cal doctors attempted to invoke the learned professions exemption to es-
cape per se invalidation of a price-fixing scheme.4 6 In Maricopa, the
doctors established maximum prices to charge patients who were policy-
holders of participating insurance plans.47 In a four to three decision,"
39. Id. at 787.
40. Id.
41. The Court left open the possibility of a limited learned professions exemption in the follow-
ing footnote:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is, of
course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act.
It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with other
business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust concepts which
originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of the professions,
may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.
Id. at 788 n.17.
42. See. e.g., Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosps., Inc., 703 F.2d 942, 949 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing in dictum that restraints imposed in a professional context might survive antitrust scru-
tiny although they would be a violation in other contexts); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980) (refusing to apply the per se rule to a maximum price-fixing
scheme by medical doctors), rev'd 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Bogus v. American Speech & Hearings
Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1978) (stating that on remand the defendants might be able to
establish a factual basis for application of the learned professions exemption).
43. See, e.g., Weiss v. York Hosp. 745 F.2d 786, 821 n.61 (3d Cir. 1984); Wilk v. American
Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221-22 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398-99 (1984).
44. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); see also National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (refusing to apply the learned
professions exemption to engineers' refusal to engage in competitive bidding).
45. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 335-36.
48. Id. at 342-57. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor did not take part in the decision. Justice
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the Supreme Court held that the learned professions exemption did not
justify supplanting the per se rule, the test usually applied to price-fixing
schemes, with the rule of reason.49 The Court, however, again left open
the possibility that professional actions could receive relaxed antitrust
scrutiny if "premised on public service or ethical norms."50
The Supreme Court cases leave the scope of the learned professions
exemption uncertain. Although the Court has recognized the possibility
of such an exemption in dictum, the Court has held that the exemption
did not apply to the cases under consideration. In the class-based denial
context, lower courts might conceivably invoke the learned professions
exemption to lessen antitrust scrutiny in two ways. First, courts might
employ the underlying rationale of the exemption to justify applying the
rule of reason to a case that would otherwise merit per se invalidation.
Second, and more controversial, courts might alter the traditional rule of
reason inquiry on the theory that the learned professions exemption justi-
fies a more lenient review of the anticompetitive conduct of professionals.
A. Avoiding the Per Se Rule
Courts that have refused to apply the per se rule to the health care
industry have often justified that result because of judicial inexperience in
evaluating the competitive effects of the health care industry and on the
anticompetitive nature of that industry.5 Neither rationale, however,
justifies avoiding the per se rule in the class-based denial context.
Judicial inexperience with the health care industry does not justify a
refusal to apply the per se rule. Northwest Wholesale mandates per se
condemnation of two well-defined categories of group boycotts.52 These
two categories exhibit effects that judicial experience has shown to be
predominantly anticompetitive. Furthermore, the two categories can be
identified with traditional antitrust analysis, such as the motivation of the
participants and the degree of market power they possess. 3 Because judi-
cial experience with the antitrust analysis to be employed compensates
Powell filed a dissenting opinion and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at
357.
49. Id. at 349.
50. Id.
51. See, eg., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980),
rey'd, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
52. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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for judicial inexperience with the health care industry, such inexperience
does not justify avoiding the per se rule.
The anticompetitive nature of the health care industry also does not
justify avoiding the per se rule in the class-based denial context.
Although the health care industry possesses many anticompetitive char-
acteristics,54 its anticompetitive nature should justify a refusal to apply
the per se rule only if a strong relationship exists between the restraint
under consideration and the anticompetitive aspects of the industry."
Such a relationship, however, does not exist in the class-based denial
context.
The anticompetitive characteristics of the industry, including substan-
tial entry barriers, the existence of third party insurers, and the inability
of consumers to compare individualized services,- 6 are only tangentially
related to class-based denials of hospital staff privileges. Therefore, be-
cause the restraint does not implicate the anticompetitive aspects of the
health care industry, courts should apply the per se rule when appropri-
ate in the class-based denial context.
Every denial of medical staff privileges, however, should not result in
per se liability for the hospital and its medical staff. Northwest Wholesale
sanctions per se liability in only two situations. First, courts can apply
the per se rule if the defendants' behavior necessarily implies anticompe-
titive animus.57 Because any class-based denial could arguably be moti-
54. The health care industry is inherently anticompetitive in nature. State licensing laws insu-
late physicians from competition and innovation. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 735-36.
The medical profession is further insulated from competition because of the high costs of medical
training. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 643 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd,
457 U.S. 332 (1982).
In addition, the existence of third party insurers further skews the normal competitive model. For
example, in 1979, insurance carriers paid for approximately two-thirds of health care bills. Dolan &
Ralston, supra note 5, at 722. In this situation, the health care consumers have little incentive to be
cost-conscious. Furthermore, even assuming that some patients would be willing to investigate
costs, the nature of individualized care is not readily susceptible to price or quality comparisons. See
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 366 n. 12 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
55. Maricopa may indicate that the anticompetitive nature of an industry will rarely, if ever,
justify removing a case from the per se rule. In Maricopa, a strong correlation existed between the
restraint, price fixing, and several anticompetitive aspects of the health industry. The Court none-
theless applied the per se rule against the restraint. 457 U.S. at 342-55. The Court's application of
the per se rule in Maricopa counsels against nonapplication of the per se rule in the class-based denial
context, when the restraint and the anticompetitive aspects of the industry are only tangentially
related. See also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (the Court
sanctioned use of the per se rule against tying arrangements in the health care industry).
56. See supra note 54.
57. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
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vated by the medical staff's ethical duty to protect the public from
inferior medical treatment, courts may rarely apply the per se rule.5"
Second, courts can apply the per se rule if the defendants possess mar-
ket power in the relevant market.59 A finding of market power should be
reserved for exceptional cases. For example, a hospital that is isolated
geographically or that possesses a substantial share of the market would
likely possess market power.60 On the other hand, a hospital in an urban
area with other hospitals located nearby would probably not have market
power.61 Thus, imposition of per se liability should be the exception
rather than the rule in class-based denial cases.
B. Altering the Rule of Reason Analysis
Courts must employ the rule of reason to evaluate the antitrust impli-
cations of class-based denials of hospital staff privileges if the per se rule
is inapplicable. The courts, however, should not invoke the learned pro-
fessions exemption to alter the traditional rule of reason inquiry.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the rule of reason in-
quiry is confined to evaluating the competitive effects of the restraint.62
For example, in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
58. See Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983) (defendant medical
doctors assert a patient care motive as the basis for the ethical rule prohibiting professional contract
with chiropractors), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984).
In addition, Northwest Wholesale suggests that even in the absence of alleged patient care motiva-
tion, class-based denials of hospital staff privileges would not require per se invalidation. According
to Northwest Wholesale, an allegation of an efficiency-enhancing or procompetitive justification
would require the case to be evaluated under the rule of reason. 105 S. Ct. at 2620 n.7. The defend-
ants in the class-based denial context could arguably justify the denial on the ground that the denied
class, as a whole, is so substandard that a review of individual qualifications would be unnecessary
and inefficient. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 5, at 729. In addition, the hospital could argue that
it denies hospital staff privileges to classes of nonphysicians in order to control the cost of malprac-
tice insurance. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 608-09 & 655. The assertion of these and other procom-
petitive justifications for class-based denials should be sufficient to avoid the per se rule based on an
inference of anticompetitive animus.
59. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. Antitrust courts have often determined
whether a defendant possesses market power in a particular market. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (requiring market power to invoke per se rule against
tying arrangements).
60. See, eg., Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d at 825-27 (upholding jury finding that the defend-
ant, which was one of two hospitals in the area and which had over 80% market share, possessed
market power).
61. For example, in Jefferson Parrish, the defendant was "only one hospital of at least twenty in
the area." 104 S. Ct. at 1566 n.44 (quoting court of appeals).
62. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
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Number 2] CLASS-BASED DENIALS
States,63 the Court invalidated an NSPE ethical guideline that prohibited
members from engaging in competitive bidding.6 The NSPE had at-
tempted to justify the restraint, claiming that the potential benefit to the
public interest should affect the antitrust analysis.65 The Court, however,
employed the traditional rule of reason analysis, notiig that from its
common-law roots to the present day, the rule of reason inquiry has fo-
cused on whether or not the challenged restraint promotes competition.66
The Court ultimately concluded that only Congress could alter the focus
of the rule of reason. 67
Courts should heed Professional Engineers and limit their rule of rea-
son inquiry to the competitive effects of class-based denials of hospital
staff privileges. Introducing into the analysis the question whether a
class-based denial is in the public interest would cause unnecessary con-
fusion.68 Underlying the Sherman Act is the congressional judgment
63. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
64. Id. at 692-93.
65. Id. at 693-94. Specifically, the NSPE argued that competition in the form of competitive
bidding would jeopardize the public health and safety by inducing engineers to engage in unethical
behavior. Id. at 693-96.
66. Id. at 688. The Court did not clearly indicate whether it was applying the per se rule or the
rule of reason analysis. Because the Court found that the NSPE's guideline constituted a violation
on its face, the decision should be interpreted as an application of the per se rule. Id. at 679.
67. Id. at 689. However, one court has altered the rule of reason inquiry on the basis of the
learned professions exemption. In Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398-99 (1984), the court announces a two-pronged test for challenges to
professional activities that are premised on ethnical duties. Id. at 227. First, the plaintiff must
establish a violation under the rule of reason. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
Second, if the plaintiff establishes such a violation, the defendant may establish: (1) that they "genu-
inely entertained a concern" for the putative evil (2) that their concern was objectively reasonable
(3) that their concern was the "dominant motivating factor" in establishing the challenged norm,
and (4) that no less restrictive alternative existed. Id. If the defendant makes this showing, the
challenged activity survives invalidation.
The Wilk test, if interpreted literally, apparently would enable the antitrust court to validate pro-
fessional restraints because of the professionals' view of the public interest. The court, however,
specifically rejected the public interest rationale as a justification for anticompetitive activity. Id. at
228-29. The court stated that it intended the test to determine whether the physicians' "patient care
motive" justified the restraint. Id. Unlike the public interest rationale, patient care analysis impli-
cates a physician's relationship with his individual patients. Id.
Strict application of the Wilk test may be an acceptable invocation of the learned professions
exemption. The defendants in the class-based denial context, however, would probably not satisfy
the Wilk test because a class-based denial would probably not be the least restrictive alternative
available on the defendants.
68. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 175. The medical professions' public interests argu-
ments should be directed at the state legislatures rather than the antitrust courts. See, e.g., Smith &
Oneck, Hospitals Facing Greater Liability for Exclusion of the Nonphysicians, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 10,
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that competition is in the public interest.69 Courts should not take it
upon themselves to determine whether 'competition or class-based denials
better serve the public interest.70 Legislatures are better suited to resolve
such broad policy questions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed antitrust challenges to class-based denials of
hospital staff privileges. Class-based denials will, at least in some circum-
stances, be susceptible to per se condemnation as illegal group boycotts.
When appropriate, courts should not refuse to apply the per se rule.
Courts, however, should not alter the traditional rule of reason inquiry.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the rule of reason inquiry
is limited to evaluating the competitive effects of the restraint. Deviation
from the traditional inquiry without congressional authorization would
be an impermissible intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative realm.
Until Congress changes the scope of the antitrust laws, courts must en-
force them as enacted.
David M. Coffey
1985, at 20, cols. 3, 4 (describing Ohio legislation requiring that medical doctors admit and supervise
all hospital patients). Such state-minded class-based denials are insulated from antitrust scrutiny by
the state action doctrine. See Kissam, supra note 7, at 619-28.
69. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
70. Id. The conclusion that the courts should limit their inquiry to the competitive effects of the
class-based denial does not render the defendants' purposes totally irrelevant to the rule of reason
inquiry. The defendants' rationale for imposing the restraint is relevant to the rule of reason insofar
as it aids the court in determining the competitive consequences. As Justice Brandeis stated:
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting a particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be obtaine are all relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because
knowledge of the intent may help the court interpret the facts and to predict the
consequences.
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also Chiropractic Cooperative
Ass'n of Mich. v. American Medical Ass'n., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 66,700, at 63,333 (E.D.
Mich. June 24, 1985) (refusing to strike patient care and public interest defenses, but acknowledging
that the defenses would not justify an anticompetitive restraint).
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